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Abstract 
 
International organisations, like the UN and EU, have encouraged their member states for 
years to increase civil servants’ compliance with particular codes of conduct. Romania 
represents probably one of the most advanced countries in attempting to legislate on civil 
servant ethics through its Code of Conduct Law. Yet, the Romanian Code of Conduct Law 
possesses significant weaknesses, emanating both from the inherent difficulties of using 
hard law in a soft law area (like civil servants’ ethics) and the Law’s silence as to specific 
procedures which government agencies should use in implementing the Law. Given these 
weaknesses, Romanian government agencies should adopt regulatory instruments which 
compensate for these weaknesses at the legislative level. In this paper, we present the 
provisions – particularly related to the establishment of agency-level ethical doctrines -- 
which regulatory drafters can use to implement these codes of conduct in a civil law system 
without running afoul of the basic requirements of civil law jurisprudence for clarity and 
predictability. We discuss the legal basis in Romanian administrative law for the elaboration 
of specific ethics-related doctrines and the ways in which such a “doctrinal approach” to 
administrative ethics can help achieve the objectives of the flawed Code of Conduct Law. 
We specifically discuss the ways in which Romanian governments can adopt such 
regulatory instruments and the types of provisions which should be included in order to help 
overcome the flaws of the Code of Conduct Law.  
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Bryane Michael, Linacre College (Oxford) 
 
Introduction 
 
The issue of ethics – particularly public sector ethics – remains one of the most contentious 
and difficult areas of work in public sector management. Government ethics often represents 
an area of lawmaking where no agreement exists in order to pass hard law. For example, 
should a civil servant who breaks his agency’s rules in order to help a citizen in distress be 
punished – or rewarded? Should civil servants escape legal liability when they ignore direct 
instructions from their superiours when they believe that ignoring those instructions serves 
the public’s interests? Many civil law legal systems like Romania’s– which rely on the 
clarity and predictability of black letter law – have been attempting to regulate the conduct 
of its civil servants through instruments familiar to the common law system – particularly 
government codes of conduct. However, unlike in the US, UK (or even French and Swedish 
systems), civil servants in countries like Romania do not have the authority to interpret their 
code of conduct regulations, establish legal reasoning – or doctrines – for taking ethical 
decisions and can not absolve themselves of liability for misconduct when they can 
demonstrate that they acted according to a particular administrative precedent or clearly in 
the public interest.  
  
We argue that legislative provisions requiring the implementation of codes of conduct in a 
public sector (like Romania’s) can only succeed those provisions allow for the development 
of legal doctrine(s) to emerge. Simply put, such legislation must allow for civil servants in 
civil law jurisdictions to use the rules of thumb, list tests, balancing tests and other relatively 
ambiguous criteria which civil servants in common law jurisdictions use in adjudicating 
ethical dilemmas at the administrative level. Yet, such provisions run counter to civil law 
jurisprudence requiring clarity and predictability. We try to show ways in which potential 
regulators who are setting up government code of conduct programmes might implement a 
doctrinal approach to codes of conduct in a civil law system without running afoul of the 
basic requirements of civil law jurisprudence for clarity and predictability.  
 
Our paper, thus, presents the ways in which regulatory drafters can adopt a doctrinal 
approach toward implementing government codes of conduct in a civil law system like 
Romania’s. The first section presents international regulatory work on model ethical codices 
and codes of conduct – showing the legal principles which are slowly filtering into 
legislation in countries like Romania. The second section describes specifically the 
Romanian Code of Conduct Law – presenting the provisions and the legal issues involved. 
We discuss the law’s shortcomings and the ways in which work at the regulatory level can 
help overcome legislative weaknesses. We specific specifically focus on the bolstering of 
ethics counsellors’ rights through an implied powers doctrine and the methods by which 
civil servants can develop ethics-related administrative legal doctrine in Romania. In the 
third section, we discuss the ways in which these implied powers to create ethics-related 
legal doctrines can be codified into a model executive regulation. We argue that, by 
codifying Romanian government ethics counsellors’ rights (and obligations) into an 
executive regulation helps establish the procedural rights (and obligations) which can ensure 
the clarity and predictability of the otherwise unclear method of ethics-related legal doctrine 
making.  
 
International Instruments Relating to Civil Servant Ethics and Codes of Conduct 
 
International Code of Conduct Principles 
 
Almost all international organisations working on issues related to public sector 
management and public administration have attempted to draft soft law legal instruments 
providing guidance on the creation of public officials’ codes of conduct.1 Figure 1 provides 
an overview of these instruments – always adopted as recommendations and thus imposing 
no specific obligations on the public officials of the respective signatory states.2 As shown, 
these instruments reflect two philosophical orientations toward civil servant (and public 
officials’) ethics and conduct.3 The OECD and EU take a soft-law approach toward 
regulating public officials’ behaviour, as such behaviour relates to the taking of ethical 
decisions.4 Such an approach recognises that little agreement on ethical issues exists 
between countries (and thus their public administrations). The soft law approach accepts that 
civil servants (and public officials more generally) require large amounts of discretion in 
order to work – involving the frequent taking of ethical decisions. Thus, these soft law 
instruments focus more on providing general principles by which public officials can resolve 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we follow the hard law and soft law dichotomy used throughout the literature (and Dr. Solomon 
provides a recent overview of the application of such soft law in administrative law tradition, particularly in 
civil law jurisdictions. Soft law instruments (such as recommendations, advice as verbal instructions and other 
admonitions on civil servants to act in a particular way deemed “ethical” by the authors of these instruments 
represent parts of a country’s ethics legal framework containing provisions in which inefficient consensus 
exists in order to establish enforcement mechanisms and insufficient clarity exists in order to define the exact 
actions prohibited or required. If consensus existed about these provisions, lawmakers would have created hard 
law – writing down the specific measures of black letter law and included measures to ensure compliance (and 
punish non-compliance). See Jason Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 
TEX. L.REV., 2008. Dr. Friedrich provides a fascinating discussion of the increasing “legality” of these soft law 
instruments. See Jurgen Friedrich, Legal Challenges of Nonbinding Instruments: The Case of the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 9 Ger. L. J. 11, 2008. We omit work by regional organisations, such as the 
Organisation of American States and large non-government organisations (like Transparency International) in 
order to focus our discussion.   
2 International organisations also finance and implement projects in member states with a focus on public 
officials’ ethics. For a good general overview of activities related to government ethics and codes of conduct 
around the world, see Elia Armstrong, INTEGRITY, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: RECENT TRENDS, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND EMERGING ISSUES, 
August 2005, available online.   
3 The elision of ethics-related regulation on civil servants and public officials significantly complicates a 
proper discussion of government ethics-related regulation. Many countries have tackled more directly ethics-
related regulation of civil servants’ conduct (namely non-politically appointed individuals in a public sector 
body). Regulating these individuals is easier on the grounds that they take technocratic, non-political decisions 
in which ethical dilemmas do not become wrapped up with political decisions. A public official refers to 
politicians serving in government (such as ministers) as well as civil servants. Thus a public official’s code of 
conduct takes into account the difficult political trade-offs which they need to take – often making these codes 
of conduct less stringent. The definition of ethics laws and administrative codes of conduct also presents a 
complication for the reader. Does a poorly enforced regulation requiring public employees to come to work 
“on time” comprise an ethics law, or a general normative act? In order to avoid a lengthy discussion about the 
definition of an ethics law (or a code of conduct), we refer to a code of conduct as a document which is 
labelled as a code of conduct and an ethics law as a document with the words “ethics law” in the title. While 
such an approach may appear at first glance high unsatisfactory, this approach does focus on laws in which 
parliament (or the relevant lawmaking body) had the intent to specifically regulate public sector ethics and 
conduct.  
4 In this paper, we refer to public officials’ (or civil servants’) ethics, ethical conduct and codes of conduct 
related to that conduct as decisions taken by these individuals in situations where: a) they work in a public 
sector agency, b) they possess administrative discretion to take decisions (or a sufficient lack of oversight 
which gives them the ability to take these decisions), c) their discretionary decision involves a choice with a 
non-obvious or multiple acceptable outcomes, and d) these outcomes require value judgements related to how 
good or bad (from an ethical viewpoint) these outcomes are. 
dilemmas when they can not determine a single clear, proper course of action.5 Because the 
principles enshrined in these general statements of principles can be interpreted numerous 
ways, civil servants have difficulty applying these principles consistently and predictably. 
The difference in interpretations also exposes public officials to administrative risk as the 
individuals or agencies enforcing these principles may rule against the public official’s 
interpretation.6  
 
Figure 1: List of International Recommendations on Public Officials’ Ethics 
 
Sponsoring 
Organisation 
Name of 
Instrument 
Details Philosophical 
approach 
United 
Nations 
(UN) 
International 
Code of Conduct 
for Public 
Officials7  
The Annex to Resolution 51/59 contains an International 
Code of Conduct for Public Officials. The Code contains 
general principles (such as those described below), 
provisions related to conflict of interest, the disclosure of 
assets, prohibitions on the acceptance of gifts, restrictions 
on the handling of confidential information and engaging in 
political activity. The Code is relatively brief (about 2 
pages). 
Hard-law 
approach 
Council of 
Europe 
(CoE) 
Codes  of 
Conduct for 
Public Officials8  
The CoE code --- spanning 14 pages --- deals with most of 
same issues as the UN International Code. As usual, CoE 
work tends to be more detailed. A number of provisions 
deal with specific issues considered now a vital part of a 
code of conduct – such as cooling off periods.  
Hard-law 
approach 
OECD Recommendation 
on Improving 
Ethical Conduct 
in the Public 
Service9
The least helpful of all the work on codes of conduct, the 
Recommendation provides 10 very abstract categorical 
imperatives.  
Soft law 
approach 
EU Proposal for an 
(EU) Ethics 
Framework10  
Only slightly better than the OECD work, the proposal 
comprises a think-piece on general attributes required of a 
code of conduct.   
Soft law 
approach 
 Source: authors based on cited documents. The dichotomisation of the legal instruments presented in the 
figure represent our own interpretation – as the division between soft law and hard law provisions is not clear.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Such an approach has often been called the deontological approach. Civil servants should master moral 
reasoning skills and not act on stringently defined rules. The other main attribute of this approach is that the 
civil servant should act according to his or her duty – in sharp contract to the Anglo-Saxon approach looking at 
a civil servant’s incentives for compliance. A discussion of public sector ethics would take our paper well off-
course. For more, see Charles Garofalo and Dean Geuras, COMMON GROUND, COMMON FUTURE: MORAL 
AGENCY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 2006.    
6 Even though soft law statements of administrative ethical principles aim at providing the public official with 
more discretion (and freedom to make ethical decisions which he or she considers serves the interests of justice 
or some other public value), they might result in public officials taking more conservative decisions. These 
public officials – who are notoriously risk averse and liable for their ethical decisions – often decide not to 
assume administrative (or personal) liability in order to uphold general principles of justice, equity, equality, 
progress, privacy, and so forth. As such, these codes of conduct tend to become more repressive over time, as 
risk averse public officials ignore provisions aimed at providing leeway and greater flexibility. For an 
interesting description of this phenomenon, see Leno Saarniit, A Public Service Code of Ethics Applied in a 
Transitional Setting: The Case of Estonia, 8 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 1, 2005. 
7 UN Resolution 51/59, Action Against Corruption (A/RES/51/59, 82nd plenary meeting, 12 December 1996), 
available online.  
8 Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, Recommendation Rec(2000)10, available online.  
9 Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service (23 April 1998), available (with 
discussion) online.  
10 Main features of an Ethics Framework for the Public sector, Proposal by the Dutch Presidency, available 
online.  
The UN and Council of Europe (CoE), on the other hand, take a more hard-law approach to 
work on public officials’ codes of conduct. Specifically, the Council of Europe Codes 
contain most of the major elements which have made their way into legislative instruments 
in the various EU member states. Work along these lines focuses on the “minimum 
standards” of most member states – leaving out the philosophical parts of the code of 
conduct contained by deontologically-focused work on civil servant codes of conduct. These 
codes of conduct typically assemble provisions usually addressed by hard law instruments in 
various countries – particularly the US. Such an approach epitomises a rule-of-law approach 
to regulation by defining obligations specifically enough such that compliance can be 
monitored and remedies (as well as punishments for non-compliance) can be defined and 
enforced. However, by relying on hard law, these instruments threaten to remove (over time) 
much of the discretion – and thus discretionary rights to uphold particular ethical values 
such as justice or the public good – from civil servants work.  
 
Figure 2: Substantive Provisions Contained in International Public Officials’ Code of 
Conduct Instruments 
 
Article numbers from each instrument Conflict of interest 
point UN  CoE Romania 
Usual areas of law 
due regard for the law 7 4 6 Constitution 
no arbitrary or 
capricious behaviour 
3 6 12 Civil servant/ PA Law 
impartiality 3 7 12 Constitution and CS or 
PA Law 
Courtesy  none 5 12 none 
avoid conflict of 
interests 
4,6 8, 13, 15, 20 3 Conflict of Interest Law 
declaration of interests 5 14 none (contained in 
separate law) 
Declaration of Assets 
Law 
political activity 11 16, 21 10 CS, PA Law or CoI 
Law 
gifts 9 18, 19 14 Anti-Corruption Law 
leaving public service 
and dealing with former 
public officials  
“cooling off period” 
none 25, 26 none CoI or AC Law 
Confidential 
information 
10 11, 22 7 State Secrets Law 
Use of government 
resources (efficiency) 
2 23 5 CS or PA Law 
“conduct becoming of a 
public official” 
1 9 12 none 
Respondeat superiour none 10, 24 none PA law 
Duty to report specious 
activities 
none 12 none PA law, admin, civil 
and criminal law 
Sanctions none 27 22 Disciplinary code 
Source: authors – based on materials cited.  
 
The scope of activities and the specificity of the provisions in these codes of conduct in 
various countries could reflect the philosophical differences between the hard law and soft 
law approaches to government ethics. The abstract nature of the OECD’s work on civil 
servant codes of conduct reflects the view that real-world situations are too complex to 
define specific regulations governing public officials’ conduct. The OECD’s work covers a 
large scope of civil servant work (as shown in Figure 2). However, none of the articles in 
their Recommendation provide specific advice for public officials in specific 
circumstances.11 The UN and CoE work, in contrast, focuses on specific elements of public 
officials’ action – usually civil servant action as judging by the nature of the activities 
regulated -- which third-party agencies can monitor and enforce. These elements focus on 
cooling off periods, the submission of asset and conflict of interest declarations, and other 
objectively monitorable actions.12  
 
Code of Conduct Principles Internationally 
 
The ethical principles contained in many international soft law instruments have spread (to a 
greater of lesser extent) to EU member states.13 Figure 3a shows an assessment, based on 
analysis from Drs. Moilanen and Salminen about the extent to which various member states’ 
codes of conduct impose specific obligations on their civil servants.14 We quantify the scope 
covered by these obligations on a scale between 1 and 5 – whereby a code of conduct has a 
greater scope if the code covers a wider range (or variety) of public sector activities. 
Accordingly, countries such as Ireland, Finland and Romania have codes of conduct 
covering a large range of civil servants’ activities. By definition, more specific codes of 
conduct derive from the incorporation of hard law provisions – and Ireland, Romania and 
Finland also lead the list of countries with highly specific government codes of conduct. 
However, little discernible relationship exists between a code of conduct’s specificity – the 
extent to which provisions are specific as usually contained in hard law provisions – and the 
code’s scope of activities covered.15 The European Commission – as an institution – 
provides a notable exception. The Commission has one of the most comprehensive codes of 
conduct; yet many of the highly specific provisions are redolent of the hard-law approach to 
civil servant ethics.16  
 
                                                 
11 As shown by the working papers and other informational materials on the OECD’s website, the French 
deontological tradition of public officials’ ethics has clearly affected the OECD’s Secretariat (which is located 
in Paris). In French administrative law, civil servants are given wide margin for action as long as their actions 
are in interest of the public interest.   
12 As discussed below, the Anglo-Saxon approach to civil servant ethics (which the UN and CoE approach 
adopt more fervently than the OECD and EU) tackles scope of civil servant action by creating judicial 
doctrines. Civil servants – often through litigation – create and gossip about principles which guide their work. 
These doctrines, specific as to the situations in which they cover, spring up for a wide range of situations. As 
such, no one- to-one correspondence exists between the scope and specificity of a code of conduct and the type 
of legal system involved; or whether such provisions are founded in hard law or soft law. For more on the 
challenges faced by different legal systems in adopting government ethics and code of conduct work, see 
Bossaert, Danielle and Christophe Demmke, MAIN CHALLENGES IN THE FIELD OF ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN 
THE EU MEMBER STATES, 2005. 
13 US scholars have most profoundly developed the English language literature on government codes of 
conduct – where they publish hundreds, if not thousands, of research articles each year. As argued below, the 
US’s common law system provides for such a vigorous debate and fine-tuning of codes of conduct. For a 
review of EU work, Christophe Demmke, ETHICS IN THE CIVIL SERVICES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU – 
MANY PARADOXES BUT NO NEED TO BE PESSIMISTIC, 2007, available online.  
14 Timo Moilanen and Ari Salminen, COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE ETHICS OF THE EU 
MEMBER STATES, available online.  
15 The correlation coefficient for the specificity and scope scores we give the 22 countries which Moilanen and 
Salminen cover is 0.64. Such a correlation coefficient shows some correlation, though certainly not enough to 
make any judgments about a positive relationship between a code of conduct’s specificity and its scope.   
16 Several factors may explain why the EU, as an organisation, has implemented a code of conduct with a 
broader scope (yet with more specific provisions) than most of its member states’ public sectors. The 
Commission represents an executive agency (albeit a supranational one), whereas the public sectors of member 
states comprise the wider range of interests contained in their judiciaries, legislatures, local governments and 
even public sector enterprises. The Commission, like the member states’ public administrations, has 
administrative tribunals which have been rendering judgments on cases with ethical dimensions. However, 
unlike most member states, these decisions from the Commission’s administrative tribunals have helped form 
the basis of the code of conduct. Such an approach to code of conduct work reflects the conflict resolution 
approach which we describe in Figure 18.  
Figure 3a: Assessments of Various European Code of Conducts
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Our analysis fails to find any trade-off between the scope and specificity of an 
administrative code of conduct. At first glance, code of conduct drafters need to decide 
whether to include general soft-law principles or a list of specific hard-law provisions – as 
trying to include both would seemingly lead to a code of conduct running hundreds of pages 
long. Figure 3a – as previously shown -- debunks the notion of a trade-off between a code of 
conduct’s specificity and scope. Countries like Poland have narrow and vague codes of 
conduct while Greece has a broad-reaching and specific code. Yet, while little specific 
correlation between scope and specificity exists, wide-scoped codes of conduct can also 
include specific provisions – and visa versa. For example, the UK and France represent the 
most interesting countries (from a code of conduct point of view) because they are often-
cited, well-developed ethics regulations evolving in rather different legal traditions. Both 
countries’ government administrations are perceived to be equally (un)trustworthy – with 
33% of their populations trusting government.17 Romania’s inclusion among countries 
which rank at the top of the list in terms of the scope covered and the specificity of its 
provisions of its civil servants’ code of conduct result from a combination of soft law and 
hard law provisions. However, in Romania’s case, such a combination makes Romania’s 
code of conduct difficult to implement. Romania falls at the bottom of the list of countries in 
terms of the implementability of its code of conduct.18 Not surprisingly, only 28% of the 
population trusts the Romanian government.  
 
The scope of these codes of conduct—particularly in Central Europe – tends to be relatively 
similar, in terms of the values these codes admonish public officials to uphold.19 Figure 3b 
shows data extracted from a study by Professor Palidauskaite, comparing different values 
covered by codes of conduct in Central and Eastern Europe.20 With the exception of 
requiring courteous treatment of citizens using public services, the majority of codes of 
                                                 
17 2006 Annual Edelman Trust Barometer, available online.   
18 Implementability refers to the ability of the government to use little staff time and resources in order to 
achieve the results set forth in the code of conduct. For example, the general lack of supervision over political 
parties in Romania render ineffective any restrictions on using office time to assist with the political campaign 
activities of political candidates. Funding, supervising and enforcing such provisions in Romania would be 
harder than in a country like Finland – where the general administrative culture accepts new regulations such 
as these more readily.   
19 If these codes of conduct place obligations on public officials, then they implicitly provide indemnification 
against prosecution in cases where they disobey regulations or instruction while relying on the implicit 
authority given by the code of conduct (to uphold the public good or other values). Such authority (and the 
reliance on such authority) constitutes an implied powers doctrine which we discuss later.   
20 Jolanta Palidauskaite, Codes of Ethics in Transitional Democracies: A Comparative Perspective, 8 PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY 1, Winter 2005-6: 35 – 48.  
conduct contain largely similar provisions.21 Not surprising given these countries post-
Social histories, all codes of conduct forbid civil servants from using government resources 
for political party purposes (campaigning or politicking more generally). Most – though not 
all – codes of conduct uncontroversially include the promotion of efficiency and/or 
effectiveness as a core ethical value. Such provisions set the basis for the soft law 
underpinning many of these codes of conduct.  
 
Figure 3b: Values Enshrined in Central European Codes of Conduct
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The commitment to hard(er) law provisions varies between Central European countries. 
Countries like Poland, Czech Republic and Estonia omit sanctions and the enforcement 
mechanisms from their codes of conduct. Ironically, while all codes of conduct value 
political neutrality, less than 50% of these codes explicit regulate political activity. Yet, of 
the provisions that remain, given the phrasing of the provisions in these codes, these values 
may be seen – from a legal practitioner’s point of view – as soft law resolutions. As 
reflected by low specificity and implementability scores, most of soft law provisions 
contained in these codes of conduct do not form an adequate basis for creating substantive 
obligations (or rights) imposable on civil servants.22   
 
Figure 3c: Content of Central European Codes of Conduct
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21 The similarity of these codes of conduct suggests that copying -- or diffusion – from abroad. See Figure 18 
for a discussion of the ways in which Central European countries could have developed these codes of 
conduct. 
22 No sane civil servant in Estonia, Romania or another Central European country would reasonably disobey 
their bosses’ orders because they believe their own decisions would better serve the public interest or the 
economise on government resources. No sane civil servant would rely on an administrative court, tribunal or 
arbiter to rule in their favour in such a circumstance. As civil servants can not rely on these codes of conduct in 
their daily work, they fail to provide substantive rights for these civil servants.  
 
As these codes of conduct fail to create substantive obligations or rights, the benefits of 
having a government code of conduct have been far from clear. Drs. Svensson and 
Wood’s study of the implementation of codes of conduct in Sweden echo the majority 
of findings in this area.23 They note that while objective benefits of government code of 
conduct programmes are difficult to identify, most public sector officials view these 
codes as useful and productive. Drs. Ashkanasy, Falkus and Callan find in their 
overview of code of conduct use (by Australian civil servants) that personal values play 
a more important role in public officials’ conduct until such time as when a “critical 
mass” of civil servants adheres to a code of conduct.24 Moreover, the effects of a code 
of conduct on government ethics over time seem highly questionable. Drs. 
Omurgonulsen and Oktem note, from their empirical study of Turkish civil servants, 
that their ethical values have not changed – despite the implementation of codes of 
conduct (and other ethics-related) programmes.25 Codes of conduct – and similar soft 
law instruments aimed at regulating government ethics, simply do not change public 
officials’ behaviour 26in the long-run.     
                                                
 
Increasing the Implementability of Codes of Conduct 
 
Given the disappointing results from previous government ethics and codes of conduct 
programmes, a number of authors have attempted to propose ways of increasing the 
implementability of such code of conduct laws. 27 As summarised in Figure 4, many of these 
approaches focus on making soft law harder.28 For example, Professor Franzese specifically 
encourages the audit and greater enforcement of ethics laws. The OECD has reiterated this 
view – with recent publications on government ethics encouraging the use of hard law 
programmes such as the implementation of conflict of interest declarations and asset 
declaration.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Goran Svensson and Greg Wood, Implementation, communication and benefits of public sector codes of 
ethics: A longitudinal study of Sweden, 22 INT’L J. OF PUB. SECTOR MAN. 4, 2009.   
24 Neal Ashkanasy,  Sarah Falkus and Victor Callan. Predictors of Ethical Code Use and Ethical Tolerance in 
the Public Sector, 25 J. of Business Ethics 3, 2000.   
25 Ugur Omurgonulsen and Kemal Oktem, Is There Any Change in the Public Service Values of Different 
Generations of Public Administrators? The Case of Turkish Governors and District Governors, J. of Bus. 
Ethics, 2009.  
26 We particularly refer to Profs. Mackenzie and Hafken’s opus on the effects of ethics programmes in the US. 
Their insightful study should be required reading for any scholar of government ethics programmes. See 
Calvin Mackenzie and Michael Hafken, SCANDAL PROOF: DO ETHICS LAWS MAKE GOVERNMENT ETHICAL?, 
2008. 
27 In further support of the lack of effectiveness of government ethics programmes – from the EU – Milanen 
and Salminen find very little statistical correlation between the implementation of ethics programmes and 
decreases in misconduct in the 27 European Union member countries which they study. According to their 
regression analysis (p. 27), almost all their correlation co-efficients are not statistically different from zero. See 
Moilanen and Salminen supra note 14.   
28 For a useful critique of recent attempts to “export” government ethics, see J Kaune, Exporting Ethics: 
Lessons from Russia's Attempt to Regulate Federal Lobbying, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV., 1996. 
29 Howard Whitton, Janos Bertok, MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A TOOLKIT, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, available online.  
Figure 4: Overview of Proposed Remedies for Soft Law Code of Conduct Work 
(ranked in terms of rigidity)30 
 
Proposal Weaknesses 
Establishment of an ethics watchdog These watchdogs tend to lack investigatory, much less prosecutorial, 
direction -- given the ambiguity about the provisions they are 
supposed to enforce.  
Punish ethical breaches Given the ambiguity of ethical dilemmas (and therefore ethical 
breaches), most punishment remains informal – forcing the official 
to plead guilty to another offence or stepping down.  
Engage in ethics audits The most promising area of ethics and code of conduct work, such 
audits – if conducted according to internal audit standards– can 
provide creative ways of promoting compliance with the spirit of a 
code of conduct.  
Certification of staff in knowledge 
of ethics code and its application 
Largely considered a waste of time by participants in such 
programmes and provides questionable benefits.31  
Simplify and clarify ethics laws into 
a uniform ethics code 
Simple harmonisation does not guarantee compliance – indeed, 
harmonisation may not be desirable across jurisdictions with 
different ethical values.  
Extend ethics provisions to third 
parties (including contractual terms 
for failing to comply with 
government’s ethics provisions) 
Doubtful legality and practical effect on private sector conduct.32  
Extend liability through qui tam and 
reduce liability for pro-active ethics 
management  
European governments are very sceptical of qui tam laws and have 
legal traditions which tend not to mitigate liability for preventive 
programmes like in the US.  
Ethics training and toolkits These “trainings” (often highly moralistic in tone) often fail to 
address specific rights and obligations. Anglo-Saxon style toolkits 
lack a legal basis in the civil law administrative tradition. 33  
Senior managers to provide ethical 
leadership 
Chicken and egg problem – if senior managers were ethical, the 
issue of organisational ethics would be attenuated – particularly 
when these senior managers’ misdeeds are explained by incentives 
they are given.  
Rediscovery of public sector virtue34  According to this argument, civil servants need to rediscover their 
commitment to the public --- an assertion which the public choice 
school would find impossible.  
Source: based on Franzese (2005).35  
                                                 
30 We rank elements according to the extent to which they create specific obligations and rights which can be 
objectively assessed and enforced – in order words, hard law.  
31 Svensson and Wood at supra note 23 most explicitly state that respondents, in their survey of Swedish civil 
servants, thought such programmes wasted their time (though not the time of their colleagues!)  
32 Can the public sector contracting authorities impose contractual terms based on provisions which are not 
(hard) administrative law? Naturally, contracting parties can agree to any (statutorily allowed) terms both sides 
deem acceptable. However, such terms would make business more expensive (by raising compliance costs) 
and fail to serve as acceptable grounds if the government procuring authority terminates the contract. As such, 
soft law ethics-related contractual restrictions are time inconsistent as the government would lack incentives to 
enforce them.    
33 Common law jurisdictions (such as the US and UK) also give civil servants discretion (to a limited extent) to 
resolve ethically ambiguous situations themselves. However, their approach to educating civil servants about 
how to resolve ethical dilemmas rather differs with methods on the Continent. In most EU member states, 
practical methods of resolving ethical dilemmas should be found in administrative law and not the ad hoc do-
it-yourself toolkits given to civil servants in the common law jurisdictions. For an example of such a toolkits 
(which have little or no basis in administrative law), see Carol Weiss Lewis and Stuart Gilman, THE ETHICS 
CHALLENGE IN PUBLIC SERVICE: A PROBLEM-SOLVING GUIDE.   
34 Such an argument comes from Michael Macaulay and Alan Lawton, From Virtue to Competence: Changing 
the Principles of Public Service,  PUB. ADMIN. REV. September – October, 2006.  
35 Prof. Franzese’s suggestions apply to the US state of New Jersey. However, much like in Europe, the US 
states are trying to come to terms with the implementation of codes of conducts across a wide range of 
administrative jurisdictions. Her proposals could not be more relevant for the European Union (and its member 
states) than the American union (and its member states – known as the United States of America). See Paula 
 
Adoption of Ethical Principles into National Legislation – The Case of Romania 
 
Overview and Institutional Structure   
 
Romania represents one of the most progressive civil law jurisdictions to attempt to regulate 
civil servants’ conduct in ethically ambiguous situations.36 Figure 5 shows each of the 
provisions of one of Romania’s key ethics-related pieces of legislation – the Code of 
Conduct Law.37 The Code of Conduct Law aims to promote ethical values within the civil 
service in order to help civil servants provide “excellent” public services (article 5). The 
Law establishes a fiduciary duty on the part of civil servants toward their agency (arts 6-7), 
regulates communication with members of the public (arts 8-13), and re-iterates the 
prohibition on taking gifts and bribes (arts 14 to 19). The Law places executive 
responsibility for implementing the present Law with the National Agency of Civil Servants 
(or NACS) and broadly defines its working procedures (arts 20-23). The Law outlines 
rudimentary disciplinary procedures (article 24) and measures related to informing the 
public about the Law. In short, the Code of Conduct Law provides for many of the 
provisions found in other EU ethics laws (as shown previously in Figures 3).  
 
Figure 5: Law on Civil Servants’ Code of Conduct  
 
Chapter I: Field of Application and General Principles 
Article 1: Field of Application                                                 Article 2: Purpose  
Article 3: General Principles                                                    Article 4: Terms  
 
Chapter II: General Norms of Moral and Professional Conduct for Civil Servants 
Article 5: To provide a high quality public service                    Article 6: Loyalty to the law 
Article 7: Loyalty to public authorities and institutions             Article 8: Freedom of opinion  
Article 9: Public activity                                                             Article 10: Political activity  
Article 11: The use of image                                                       Article 12: Relationships  
Article 13: International relations                                               Article 14: Restrictions on gifts  
Article 15: Participation in decision making                               Article 16: Objectivity 
Article 17: The use of political prerogatives                              Article 18: The use of public resources 
Article 19: Restricted participation in public contracts    
 
Chapter III: Institutional Arrangements 
Article 20: The public institution in charge                               Article 21: Notification 
Article 22: Settling the case                                                       Article 23: Publicity on reported cases  
 
Chapter IV: Final provisions 
Article 24: Accountability                                                         Article 25: Harmonization of internal rules 
Article 26: Publicity      Article 27: Enforcement 
 
Source: Romanian Code of Conduct Law 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Franzese, Restoring the Public Trust: An Agenda for Ethics Reform of State Government and a Proposed 
Model for New Jersey, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 4, 2005 
36 Professor Mungiu-Pippidi provides a possible explanation for Romania’s aggressive stance on civil servants’ 
ethics. She notes that the Romanian civil service may suffer from a lack of accountability. However, the lack 
of accountability in question is not to the electorate or even particular interest groups (a model of 
accountability stressed by the US and UK systems). The accountability in question pertains to the 
administrative ethos of the civil service itself. In this way, the Romanian public administration follows the 
French system much more closely than the US and UK system. Civil servants are accountable to themselves 
and the deontological ethic governing their work (in the French as enshrined in administrative law). See Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Culture of Corruption or Accountability Deficit? 11/12 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 4/1, 2002-3.  
37 Code of Conduct for the Civil Servants (Law 157/2004) [hereinafter the Code of Conduct Law], available 
online.  
Like in most Central and Eastern European countries, many of the provisions contained in 
the Code of Conduct Law are repeated in other laws. For example, article 41 of the Civil 
Service Law, in substance, repeats article 7 of the Code of Conduct Law -- requiring 
“professionalism, loyalty and fairness, and to refrain themselves from any action that might 
cause damage to the public organisation.”38Article 42 of the Civil Service Law repeats 
article 11 of the Code of Conduct Law – requiring public officials to “refrain themselves 
from expressing or manifesting their political believes.” Similar overlaps exist related to the 
guarding of state secrets and confidentiality (article articles 44-45 of the Civil Service Law 
and article 7 of the Code of Conduct Law), and the prohibition on accepting gifts (art 46 of 
the Civil Service Law and article 14 of the Code of Conduct Law). Article 70.3 of the Civil 
Service Law defines disciplinary actions applicable to civil servants violating provisions of 
the Civil Service Law (including warnings and reprimands as well as more significant 
penalties such as deducting 5-10% from the civil servant’s pay-check for a duration of 1-3 
months or the suspension of the right to promotion for 1-3 years).  
 
The Code of Conduct Law contributes ambiguity to an already vague and overlapping 
institutional structure aimed at regulating civil servant ethics in Romania. Romanian 
administrative law, in general, comprises a patch-work of dated laws (some adopted before 
the establishment of the 1991 republic), emergency government decisions, and various 
parliamentary decrees.39 The Code of Conduct Law places the competence for monitoring 
the ethical behaviour by civil servants with the NACS.40 Clearly then, ethics counsellors 
working in the NACS fall under NACS jurisdiction. However, a separate Ethics Order also 
establishes agency-level ethics counsellors which work with staff as well as the 
NACS.41Clearly, through the Romanian Organic Law, ethics counsellors working in line 
ministers derive their competence for monitoring the ethical conduct of their peers through 
the minister’s or agency director’s delegated authority. 42 As shown in Figure 6, ethics 
counsellors’ competence to supervise the behaviour of colleagues (for conformance with 
Romania’s ethics-related laws) represents a shared competence -- deriving from both their 
administration as well as the NACS. Any advice they give must derive from the same 
administrative sources which individuals (like advisors) have and any ability to advice on 
disciplining staff must derive from the same authority which the disciplinary committees use 
in the function of their work. However, no law (or regulation) specifically defines the 
competencies of these ethics counsellors – particularly those working in Romanian 
government agencies.   
 
                                                 
38 Regarding the Regulations of Civil Servants (Law 188/1999), [hereinafter the Civil Service Law], available 
online.  
39 Local researchers such as Dr. Matei, confirm that the highly disarticulated nature of the Romanian public 
administration. See Lucica Matei, ROMANIAN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES, 2009, available online.  
40 The authority for ethics counselors comes from art. 20 of the Code of Conduct Law – which empowers the 
NACS to review agencies’ conduct and the Law on Civil Servants.  
41 National Agency for Public Servants Order for Setting-Up a Unitary Framework Regarding the Methods 
Used to Fill-In and Send Data and Information Regarding the Observance of Norms of Conduct by Public 
Servants and the Application of Disciplinary Procedures (Order no. 4500/2008 of 21 April 2008),[hereinafter 
the Ethics Order].    
42 The authority to delegate competencies derives from the Law on the Organisation and Operation of the 
Romanian Government (Law No.90/2001)[hereinafter the Romanian Organic Law].  
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Figure 6: Institutional Schematic of Ethics Counsellors in Romanian Law
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An Administrative Implied Powers Doctrine for Ethics Counsellors?  
 
Only a doctrine of administrative organisation can help resolve the problems posed by 
Romania’s vague and overlapping ethics-related institutional structure.43 Such a doctrine of 
administrative organisation – as such a doctrine applies to the implementation of ethics-
related legislation -- must define how competencies devolve to ethics counsellors and how 
organisational units (such as the NACS and any particular government agency) share these 
competencies. Such a doctrine should also remedy the Code of Conduct Law’s failure to 
address ethics counsellors’ potentially overlapping jurisdiction with other bodies such as 
internal audit (or inspection) – particularly as International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) standards require surveillance over an organisation’s “culture of 
compliance” and general ethical culture.44  
 
Such an administrative doctrine should also correctly assign and allocate competencies and 
administrative rights so that ethics counsellors can comply with their increasingly 
burdensome obligations.  Figure 7 shows how the Code of Conduct Law has increased the 
obligations on ethics counsellors (and thus their liability in cases where they fail to perform 
when staff under their watch commit ethical breaches). The Code of Conduct Law explicitly 
grants the NACS rights over executive agencies in terms of collecting complaints and 
following up on them.45 Such an obligation pulls authority toward to the NACS and 
(incidentally) creates obligations whose costs are likely to exceed their benefits – resulting 
in large-scale non-compliance. Managers working in line ministries, however, have few (if 
any) additional obligations imposed on them. They should have acted ethically before -- as 
well as after -- the adoption of the Code of Conduct Law.   
 
Ethics counsellors in executive agencies, though, receive the bulk of the substantive 
obligations. They are required, by article 20 of the Code of Conduct Law, to supply the 
                                                 
43 By legal doctrine, we refer to the widely accepted practice of establishing legal principles, creating theories 
which are tested in court or during another form of arbitration. Over time, the successful application of these 
theories contributes to the larger doctrine in the area. To take an obvious example (from a common law 
jurisdiction in order to clearly demonstrate the approach we are discussing), many administrators (and private 
citizens alike) may rely on a theory of tort liability in the US. When a US citizen (or government agent) sues 
someone for tort damages, they test that theory – in a a common law jurisdiction, often build around a number 
of case precedents. While civil jurisdictions (such as Romania) do not precedents in the development of legal 
theories, they do look at how laws are being applied by other courts and in practice during their interpretation 
of specific statutes or provisions in administrative law. Romania – for reasons which we subsequently describe 
in great detail – may use a doctrine-based approach in certain areas of administrative law – particularly related 
to the regulation of civil servant ethics.  
44 Law on Public Internal Audit, available online.   
45 Code of Conduct Law, art. 20.  
NACS with information about ethical breaches. As agency directors have been responsible 
for establishing these positions, they expect their ethics counsellors to deal with complaints 
related to unethical conduct in their administration. Agency managers – thus – possess 
liability (both under the Code of Conduct Law and the general administrative procedures in 
force) for ethical lapses of staff in their department. However, as agency directors have not 
issued explicit instructions by which these ethics counsellors should function – they have 
deprived them of any administrative rights upon which to off-set these liabilities.  
 
Figure 7: Obligations and Rights Created at Various Administrative Levels from the 
Code of Conduct Law 
 
 Obligations Rights 
NACS staff Major addition to obligations. The 
NACS, in effect, becomes 
responsible for all ethical breeches 
in the Romanian administration.  
Countervailing rights established in the 
Code of Conduct Law to demand 
information and process cases of suspected 
breaches of ethics.  
Ethics Counsellors in 
executive agencies 
These counsellors obliged to 
control their ministry’s staff and 
act as liaison with the NACS. Yet, 
they have no powers to subpoena 
managers or suspects.  
None – these counsellors obtain no powers 
to counsel staff, conduct preliminary 
inquiries into ethics allegations, and do not 
obtain more resources.  
Ministerial and 
executive agency 
managers 
Managers have same obligations as 
before to supervise staff – 
obligation to send information to 
NACS.  
None – managers can not ‘pass off’ liability 
in the case of an ethics breach by their staff. 
Cadre(s) of Civil 
servants  
None – difficult to argue the Code 
of Conduct Law imposes new 
substantive rights or obligations on 
the majority of Romanian civil 
servants.  
None – the Code of Conduct Law does not 
provide new protections or decreased 
ambiguity during an administrative 
proceeding in cases of suspected ethical 
offences (under the Code of Conduct Law).  
Source: authors.  
 
Given the increased implicit obligations (and thus administrative liability) imposed on ethics 
counsellors, an administrative doctrine must establish either (preferably) secundum legem or 
(at the worst case) praeter legem rights for ethics counsellors.46 Under the present 
institutional design, agency directors hold liability for failing to provide the NACS with 
information (as required under article 20 of the Code of Conduct Law). Yet, no theory of 
administrative law would reasonably hold ethics counsellors liable for responsibility placed 
on them by their superiours if these superiours also did not delegate the authority required to 
fulfil those obligations. Part, if not most of that authority (or grant of administrative rights) 
consists of the right to counsel staff or engage in the prevention of ethical offences. Because 
agency directors are liable for counselling their staff on ethical issues, and because they 
have implicitly delegated this responsibility to ethics counsellors, ethics counsellors have the 
ad hoc right to engage in such training in order to reduce their own administrative liability 
for ethical faults in their department.  
 
A doctrine of implied powers (related to the increased rights of ethics counsellors to deal 
with the obligations imposed on them) may be supposed on three grounds. First, Profs. 
Galligan and Smilov explicitly note that the Romanian executive has the authority to issue 
                                                 
46 Secundum legem – more commonly known as secondary or delegation legislation – refers to regulations 
passed by executive agencies under the authority of parliament. Praeter legem refers to executive rulemaking 
without any explicit grant of authority by parliament. Praeter legem represents a fascinating area of law (as 
such law, at its best, represents executive initiative to respond to a changing regulatory environment). At its 
worst, praeter legem represents simple executive usurpion of parliamentary sovereignty.  
praeter legem as well as secundum legem (regulations).47 Such an administrative structure 
significantly simplifies the creation of a doctrine-based approach to administrative ethics. 
Second, without a functioning system of administrative courts, such praeter legem can not 
be challenged by the subjects of such rulemaking. Thus, the executive possesses de facto 
rights to engage in such policymaking – albeit with a narrow range allowed by parliament’s 
failure to sanction the executive. Third, heads of executive agencies clearly intent to 
delegate their authority to these ethics counsellors, by virtue of creating these posts in the 
first place. The creation of an ethics counsellor job function, in itself, may be interpreted as 
a clear intent to delegate the minister’s or director’s authorities to his or her sub-ordinate – 
otherwise, the move would be wasteful and irresponsible.  
 
All Romanian agencies should adopt an executive instruction or regulatory instrument 
aimed at clarifying the many ambiguities inherent in these ethics counsellors’ job functions. 
As shown above, the Code of Conduct Law -- and the act of creating ethics counsellors in 
the various Romanian government agencies -- clearly grants implied powers to these ethics 
counsellors. Many of these implied powers derive from praeter legem (de facto and 
unwritten rulemaking by the executive) associated with current work on civil servant ethics. 
Naturally, in a legal tradition which values predictability and clarity, executive agencies 
should prefer well-defined instructions and rules to the existing system of implied powers 
and informal obligations. Article 25 of the Code of Conduct Law clearly allows executive 
agencies to regulate in this area by, “harmoni[sing] their internal rules of organization and 
operation or the specific codes of conduct...[to the Code of Conduct Law].” The creation of 
a code of conduct regulation clearly comprises such “harmonisation.” 
 
The Ethical Dilemmas of the Ethics Law and the Use of Legal Doctrine 
 
The Code of Conduct Law repeats and reflects ethical conflicts inherent in civil servants’ 
work -- without providing any method of resolving them. Figure 8 shows some of the ethical 
dilemmas which clearly stand out in the Code of Conduct. Consider the following 
hypothetical scenario. A Romanian civil servant (let’s call him Mircea) working in the 
Ministry of Finance knows a colleague with whom he studied in the USA. He knows his 
colleague (let’s call him Alexander) would be the best candidate for a newly opened – and 
very important position (which involves working with Mircea). Mircea does not trust the 
current committee-based “objective” method of selecting candidates – as such committees 
tend to produce compromise candidates who are good at getting jobs and not so good at 
doing them. Mircea acts under the honest belief that his friend and colleague Alexander is 
the most qualified person for the job (and working with this individual would be much 
easier). On the one hand, the person should assist this person; as selecting a superiour 
candidate clearly represents the public interest (as required by article 5 of the Code of 
Conduct). On the other hand, the civil servant should clearly refrain from using personal 
relationships and helping friends (as required by article 12 of the Code of Conduct Law). In 
ethical dilemmas such as these, the Code of Conduct Law provides no guidance about how 
to select between its conflicting articles. The Code of Conduct Law makes some of the 
ethical dilemmas faced by Romanian civil servants clearer – but fails to provide any 
concrete method of resolving these dilemmas.  
 
Romanian civil servants must be explicitly allowed to work out solutions – by forming legal 
doctrines -- to these ethical dilemmas. Romania’s public administration – in its current 
incarnation – is relatively young. Romania’s administrative law does not provide the same 
types of legal protections and a “case” history (for lack of a better word) of defending those 
                                                 
47 See Denis Galligan and Daniel Smilov, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1996-
1998., 1999, p. 251.  
protections as the French, German or other Continental systems.48 In the French and 
Swedish systems (for example), the lowest level civil servants have discretion to take 
administrative decisions. Their decisions become part of the body of administrative, unless 
and until such time, as their superiours amend or veto those decisions. Romanian 
administrative law, though, does not explicitly allow for the delegation of administrative 
discretion to the lowest levels.  
 
Figure 8: Ethical Dilemmas Arising from Code of Conduct Law 
 
Dilemma Description 
Public interest versus 
Government interest 
(art. 5 vs. art. 7) 
The government agency may take decisions which actually (or appear at the time) to 
run counter to the public’s interest. Examples include withholding information, or 
bureaucrats engaging in seemingly wasteful activity in order to win internal 
bureaucratic political games. Government agencies may also act in the long-term 
public interest, ignoring present publicly popular policies.  
Restraint on 
relationships versus 
need to provide high 
quality services  
(art. 12 vs. art. 5) 
Most notable when Romanian civil servants use personal friendships in order to 
achieve work tasks (like calling in favours in order to get a delivery on-time). In 
Romania, like in most public services, government contracts also follow the 
invisible network of personal relations which “grease” the wheels of public sector 
service provision. Such a conflict of interest also raises the possibility of corruption.  
Freedom of expression 
versus fidelity to 
agency 
(art. 7 vs. 8) 
Probably the most controversial (and ambiguous) part of the Code of Conduct Law). 
The Law specifically prohibits civil servants from making public statements critical 
of the government or the person’s agency. However, such statements may serve 
public interests as civil servants know the implementation of a policy at the ground 
level. Such a conflict invokes the core value of freedom of speech versus the civil 
servant’s fiduciary responsibility to his agency.  
Rule of law versus 
efficiency  
(art. 5 vs. 6)   
Should civil servants sit in offices writing reports which no one will read? On the 
one hand, they have agreed (by their employment contract) to complete tasks given 
to them. On the other hand, these reports seem to serve no purpose – so the civil 
servant should “run away” (to the extent possible) from these wasteful assignments.  
Conflict of interest 
(art. 9 vs. 12).  
In theory, when the civil servant serves his own interests, he or she serves the public 
interest (as long as his or her incentives are aligned with the interests of the public). 
An example of a potential ethical dilemma arises from a government officials work 
in an NGO which works on a topic directly related to his agency’s work. On the one 
hand, the government official would have a great deal of expertise to offer the NGO. 
On the other hand, the government official may be tempted to use his influence to 
affect the NGO’s (or his agency’s) policy.  
source: authors 
 
As other European countries’ administrative legal systems show, a doctrinal approach 
toward ethics regulation is not antithetical to the civil law system. France’s deontological 
approach to ethics (or the systems used all over the EU) whereby ethical decisions are 
challenged in administrative tribunals or courts, provides a type of “case law” by which civil 
servants establish (at their own risk) ethics-related doctrines.49 The Romanian civil servant 
certainly possesses the authority – by virtue of the prateur legem and the implied powers 
conferred by the Code of Conduct Law – to establish particular doctrines related to civil 
servant ethics.  
 
In most civil law jurisdictions, ethic- related legal doctrines – and the doctrinal approach to 
ethics regulation which we advocate in this paper – evolved roughly as shown in Figure 9. 
Civil servants in these jurisdictions, exposed to the numerous ethical dilemmas of their daily 
                                                 
48 Dr. Bobek provides an interesting discussion of the evolution of reasonableness as a test of administrative 
action in a number of European jurisdictions. See Michal Bobek, Reasonableness in Administrative Law: A 
Comparative Reflection on Functional Equivalence, in Giovanni Sartor, Giorgio Bongiovanni, and Chiara 
Valentini, REASONABLENESS AND LAW, 2009.  
49 A comparison of European administrative legal systems would take our discussion outside the bounds of a 
relatively short paper. As such, we refer the reader to the authors we cite for a fuller description.  
work, took discretionary decisions – often with the knowledge of relevant hard law 
provisions, such as not discriminating between service users based on ethnicity or gender.50 
Recently, as shown in Figures 3 above, these civil servants will have received codes of 
conduct or similar ethical guidance in the form of soft law. Civil servants with discretionary 
authority take discretionary decisions (on situations involving an ethical dilemma) based on 
some system of values – often personal values.51 In written form, these decisions form the 
basis of formal ethics-related administrative law. Unwritten decisions, while not 
representing precedents in the formal sense of Anglo-Saxon law, do create expectations by 
service users (and other civil servants who observe the decision being taken) in the future.52 
In most civil law jurisdictions, failure to decide similarly in similar circumstances would 
constitute capricious and arbitrary behaviour -- which would be stricken down in 
administration fora (such as by the agency’s director or an administrative court where 
available) or in political fora (such as appearing in the daily newspaper and exposing the 
ministry to political pressure to apply consistent rules). The codification of government 
ethics, in a civil law system (such as Romania), proceeds much more on a doctrinal 
approach than other parts of administrative law. Decisions taken by civil servants – and the 
various forms of soft law previously mentioned -- form a legitimate expectation by both 
service uses and other civil servants than such ethics-related decisions shall be repeated in 
similar circumstances. Challenges to these decisions require written replies from either the 
head of the agency or an administrative court – formalising previously informal parts of 
ethics-related administrative law.  
 
Figure 9: The Development of Legal Doctrines Guiding Administrative Law in Cases of 
Potential Breaches of Civil Servants’ Ethical Conduct 
 
1. Consider facts of the ethical dilemma and any relevant hard or soft law provisions  
2. Take a decision based on post-conventional or deontological principles 
3. Wait for challenge by either subject of ethical decision or supervisor 
4. If no challenge, decision forms part of legitimate expectation by both service users and other civil 
servants (though no stare decisis or binding precedent), 
5. If challenged, the administrative supervisor (or administrative court if existing) takes a decision – 
usually issuing an administrative decision (again, no stare decisis in civil law jurisdictions), 
6. Resolutions of these ethical dilemmas form informal institutions (through administrative 
enculturation) and formal institutions (through subsequent administrative decrees and formal 
decisions).   
  
Source: authors.  
                                                 
50 Many Central and Eastern European countries are only starting to develop a well categorised body of 
administrative law. In these countries, hard (or soft) law provisions related to ethics would be found in 
director’s instructions or decisions (such as emails to all staff or instructions duly stamped and sent around to 
all staff by paper post). The filing and categorisation of these emails in something like a consolidated code of 
regulations or procedures is almost entirely lacking. The relative chaos by which administrative acts are 
promulgated further militates for a doctrine-based approach to ethics-related regulation. Civil servants require 
overarching principles which can be easily remembered instead of specific instructions contained on various 
scraps of paper which may be lost in the office.    
51 Most of the empirical studies previously cited show that civil servants resolve ethical dilemmas according to 
the ethical values they receive at home or their personal values -- and not according to any system of 
administrative values. Professor Gibson notes that most administers in the US still use “conventional” moral 
reasoning instead of the preferred post-conventional. See Pamela Gibson, Examining the Moral Reasoning of 
the Ethics Adviser and Counselor: The Case of the Federal Designated Agency Ethics Official, 11 PUB. 
INTEGRITY 2, 2009. Any discussion of these frameworks would take us outside of the bounds of the present 
paper.   
52 In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, the doctrine of legitimate expectation covers roughly these ideas. The 
codified civil law tradition requires less such a doctrine, as the principles of consistency and predictability 
govern the codification and application of civil law.   
 
The potential for the inconsistent application of ethics-related doctrine seems to violate the 
fundamental nature of the rule of law which a civil law tradition upholds. However, ethical 
decisions occur in the area of law where no consensus already exists on a course of action – 
otherwise, hard law (rather than soft law) would guide civil servants. The inconsistent 
application of ethics doctrine then already occurs. Moreover, there is no a priori reason to 
think that one single doctrine should govern different ministries in the public sector. A 
popular view of ethics in executive agencies views Ministry of Health officials placing 
compassion as an important ethical value. Whereas such popular notions of administrative 
ethics might see officials in the Ministry of Finance esteeming hard-nosed, efficiency 
oriented decisions. Civil servants in the Ministry of Culture can be (and should be) more 
“liberal” than those in the Ministry of Defence.53 The Ministry of Health (or Culture) 
attracts different types of applicants --with different ethical values -- than the Ministry of 
Finance (or Defence). Multiple ethical doctrines can (and do) operate in different public 
sector organisational units. The development of different these different ethical doctrines in 
Romania would result in a rich administrative case law, adjudicated by administrative law 
judges and senior level officials who can steer decisions toward a consensus. Their decisions 
– which remove doctrines which do not conform to some basic understanding of ethics held 
by the majority of civil servants – can form the basis of a broader public sector ethics 
doctrine.54    
 
Indeed, to resolve these ethical dilemmas, the Romanian civil service must allow for a 
doctrinal approach to the creation of ethics-related administrative law. Romanian agencies 
will not allow the NACS to engage in extensive regulation over their internal affairs. At first 
glance, the NACS adopting an ethics regulation covering all government agencies seems to 
comprise the fastest and easiest approach to establishing a unitary framework of ethics-
related administrative law in Romania.55 Yet, even the low rates of compliance with the 
current Code of Conduct Law – requiring all agencies to submit ethics related information 
required by the Ethics Order to the NACS -- suggests that Romanian government agencies 
will not simply yield to the NACS’s will.56  
 
Other reasons militate for a doctrinal approach to ethics-related administrative law in 
Romania. A doctrinal approach to administrative ethics can provide the new ethics 
counsellors in Romanian public agencies with a useful role. Literally, thousands of civil 
servants – serving as the ethics counsellors for their agencies – are sitting around waiting for 
direction. Moreover, the application of a doctrinal approach to administrative ethics can help 
overcome the wide-spread administrative inertia which follows from excessive civil 
servants’ risk-averse.57 In other civil law jurisdictions, civil servants balance the risk and 
                                                 
53 In the last 5 years, a number of researchers have attempted to quantify (using surveys) these differences in 
values. For one example of such a survey, see Vrangbaek, Karsten, Public Sector Values in Denmark: A 
Survey Analysis, 32 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN.6, 2009.  
54 Such an approach represents the standard method by which ethics-related legal doctrines are made in civil 
law jurisdictions. 
55 The Civil Service Law empowers the NACS to create regulating binding on the whole Romanian civil 
service.  
56 Data for exact compliance are difficult to obtain. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a very low level of 
compliance.  
57 The literature on the Romanian civil service widely comments on this risk aversion (and simple inertia). 
Iancu and Ungureanu, besides presenting data showing the extent of this phenomenon, note that such risk 
aversion arises as the result of rational strategic actions by these civil servants. In a rather cunning argument, 
they claim that a highly politicised civil service exposes civil servants to professional risks and an ever-
changing policy environment. By strictly following department procedures and not doing extra work which 
could expose them to reprisals of other staff, they manage to remain employed without facing these reprisals. 
return of their ethical decisions – often placing themselves at risk (and receiving rewards for 
taking those risks). These civil servants act – because their administrative law indemnifies 
them in cases where their risk-taking (in the public interest) has unforseen, negative 
consequences. Forcing Romanian civil servants to act, based on a particular doctrine of 
administrative ethics – and forcing them (rather than their superiours to answer for their 
decisions) – teaches them to take acceptable risks in the public’s interests much more than 
any training course. As such, the interesting legal question revolves not on whether a 
doctrinal approach to ethics is allowed, but how regulatory instruments can implement such 
an approach legally.  
 
An implementing regulation for the Code of Conduct Law – adopted by line ministries – 
would improve the effectiveness of the Law. As shown in Figure 8, the Code of Conduct 
Law itself contains ethical tensions which only a set of principles can resolve.58 As 
subsequently shown in Figure 9, in the administrative law of many civil law jurisdictions, 
the decisions taken by civil servants, ethics counsellors and agency managers (decisions 
which resolve these ethical dilemmas) become codified into procedures and a more formal 
body of administrative regulation. A regulation, clarifying the ways in which government 
agencies can apply the Code of Conduct Law provides procedural rights which civil servants 
may subsequently rely upon if their discretionary decisions are later challenged.59 An ethics 
regulation – defining the ways by which ethics doctrines can be defined given the legislation 
in force – would ensure procedural (if not substantive) consistency and the rule of law.  
 
An implementing regulation for the Code of Conduct Law, most importantly, would provide 
the basis of a single, consolidated piece of law – helping to unify the various provisions 
contained in the multiple ethics-related legislative acts. As Prof. Mungiu-Pippidi notes, “too 
many pieces of legislation compete and overlap already on corruption and accountability. 
The main piece addressing civil servants is far from being comprehensive, nor does it cover 
their possibly being related to a controversial activity before or after having a public 
position, and carries no penalties for infringement...The administration needs one clear code 
of conduct.”60 An implementing regulation, at the administrative level, can provide that 
clear code of conduct.  
 
The Current Legal Framework Governing Civil Servant Ethics  
 
In Romania, like in most other countries, legislative provisions related to civil servant ethics 
comprises more than just the items in the Code of Conduct Law. Most importantly, the 
Romanian parliament has also adopted laws on the disclosure of assets and the conflict of 
interests under the Law on the National Integrity Agency.61 The National Integrity Agency 
Law provides that mostly senior officials shall submit asset declarations and conflict of 
                                                                                                                                                      
See Diana-Camelia Iancu and Mihai Ungureanu A Public Choice approach to the selection of bureaucrats in 
Romania, available online.  
58 Figure 12 below describes some of the specific tests civil servants can use to resolve these tensions inherent 
in the Code of Conduct law.  
59 The creation of clear administrative procedures governing the way by which civil servants can take 
discretionary ethics-related decisions (based on doctrines developed in their administrative legal framework) 
would also help reduce their aversion taking the risks concomitant with those decisions. Even if Romanian 
civil servants took the “wrong” decision – but using the “right” procedure – they could rely on their following 
the procedures in their defence.   
60 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Corruption or Widespread Administrative Malfunction - A Policy Failure Warning, 
paper presented at the conference Informal Economy in the EU Accession Countries: Size, Scope, and the 
Trends in Trafficking and Corruption, Sofia, available online. 
Corruption or Widespread Administrative Malfunction - A Policy Failure Warning  
61 National Integrity Agency Law (No. 144/2007) as modified by Government Emergency Ordinance 49/2007, 
[hereinafter the National Integrity Agency Law].   
interest declarations – though subsequent laws have expanded the requirement to civil 
servants.62 The Law requires all public officials to submit both asset declarations and 
conflict of interest statements annually.63 The National Integrity Agency ensures that public 
officials submit declarations on-time and provides ongoing verification of the data in the 
declarations.64  
 
While the Code of Conduct Law appears to cover the soft law parts of Romania’s 
government ethics legal framework, the National Integrity Agency Law clearly contains the 
hard law provisions. Figure 10 compares the rigidity of the National Integrity Agency Law’s 
provisions with the provisions contained in the Code of Conduct Law.65 Such rigidity the 
extent to which each article creates substantive rights or obligations which can be 
independently assessed and relied upon. For example, article 7.1 of the Code of Conduct 
Law requires loyalty to public authorities -- specifically establishing that they shall “protect 
the prestige” of their institution as well as “refrain from any action that might harm its image 
or its legal interest.” Without a more specific test – establishing a legal definition for 
prestige (for example), a Romanian public official can not know whether his statements – 
maybe even critiques of the agency’s policy – hurt the agency’s prestige or bolstered it.66 
Without more specific provisions (or a regulatory instrument defining the conditions under 
which public statements materially damage an agency’s prestige), an administrative court 
would have a very little guide for determining if the public official acted appropriately.  
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Figure 10: Creation of Substantive Obligations by Various Articles
source: authors
 
 
In contrast, the National Integrity Agency Law represents the hard law part of Romania’s 
ethics law. For example, article 4 – relating to the preliminary verification of declarations 
Agency inspectors receive -- contains 9 sub-provisions outlining the exact procedures to use. 
The article, like most in the Law, outline the time period for verification (art. 4.1), the 
                                                 
62 Id. at art 9. Art. 9.2h specifically allows for other persons to submit these declarations “as provided by law.” 
Such phrasing is usually meant as provided by other acts, regulations and other legal decisions. Confusingly, 
the same law subsequently – in article 39 – provides a more exhaustive (34 point) list of persons who should 
submit these declarations. Specifically, 39.1(29) mandates the submission of such declarations by “persons 
with leading and control positions” and “public servants, including those with a special status.” The sub-point 
clearly aims to cast the net as wide as possible – covering those “who carry out their activity within all the 
central or local public authorities or, as the case may be, within all public institutions.”  
63 Id. at art 42(2).  
64 Id. at art 13  
65 As noted in Figure 4, the rigidity of legal provisions relates to the extent by which they create definite 
substantive rights or obligations which can be independently assessed (by an administrative court for example) 
for compliance.  
66 During the 1990s, many Western civil servants to offer carefully constructed critical assessments of their 
agencies’ policies. Such assessments allowed them to show the public that government officials could be self-
critical and did not suffer from “bunker mentality” as claimed in many newspaper articles. Many writers have 
described the process by which media coverage affects ministerial work and the delivery of public services. 
For a standard reference about the mediatization of public sector work of For a standard reference in this area, 
see T. Cook, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION, 1998.  
procedure to follow (art. 4.2), procedures to follow in case the Agency finds an inaccurate 
declaration (art. 4.3), a definition of material mis-statements (art. 4.4), the duty to notify 
authorities in cases when the Agency detects material mis-statements (arts. 4.5 and 4.6), 
release of persons from inspection (art. 4.7), provisions protecting the confidentiality of 
declarations (art 4.8), and a clause guaranteeing immunity if person being audited is not 
informed about the Agency’s inspection (art. 4.9).  
 
These provisions – as well as others -- represent Romania’s ethics-related legal framework. 
An ethics related legal framework is defined as the soft law and hard law provisions, 
specifically defined under a government ethics programme or policy, and found in various 
legislative and regulatory acts which aim to regulate public official’s conduct. As shown in 
Figure 11, the Romanian ethics legal framework consists of a number of legislative acts 
which impose obligations on public officials.67  
 
Figure 11: Romania’s Ethics Legal Framework –  
Legislatively Implied Obligations on Ethics Counsellors 
 
Law Implied Responsibilities on Ethics Counsellors 
Code of Conduct Law Most directly establishes basis for work of ethics counsellors (and civil 
servants). 
Anti-Corruption Law (78/2000) To advice in cases where civil servants either take bribes or are solicited.  
Civil Service Law (188/1999).  Imposes many of the same obligations on civil servants, but now ethics 
counsellors are obliged to monitor compliance (particularly arts. 
40somethings). 
Asset Declaration Law 
(115/1996)  
give advice on compliance with asset declarations, cover ethical 
dimensions (how to value assets, what constitute a conflict of interest and 
so forth).  
Law on Transparency 
(161/2003) 
Ethics counsellors can advice what to publish online, how to deal with 
requests for information which are in the public interest (but not the 
Agency’s interest or the interests of its minister).  
Whistleblowers Law 
(571/2004)  
Give advice on whether to blow whistle, provide advice on how to blow.  
Source: authors. 
 
An implementing regulation can resolve the ambiguity arising from the current ethics-
related legal framework. For example, the Whistleblowers Law’s definition of the public 
interest directly clashes with the definition provided by the Code of Conduct Law. In the 
Code of Conduct Law, the emphasis placed on the “public interest” stresses the public as 
“natural and legal persons, of public and private law, Romanian and foreign” with a side 
emphasis on “[as well as] the fulfilment of duties by public servants.” 68  In contrast, the 
Whistleblowers Law stresses “the integrity, impartiality and efficiency of public authorities 
and institutions” as comprising the public interest.69  The Whistleblowers Law goes on to 
attempt to establish its own supremacy over the Code of Conduct Law; through article 4d 
which notes that “in case of public interest warning the deontological or professional norms 
which might prevent the public interest warning shall not be enforceable.” Clearly, if 
                                                 
67 Other laws include Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public Administration (including various amendments), Law 
on Local Public Administration (2001). For a more complete description of this legal framework, see Adrian 
Moraru, Adrian Baboi–Stroe, Adrian Badila, and Corneliu Liviu Popescu, New Ways of Managing Conflict of 
Interest Problems in Romania, In Barbara Kudrycka, COMBATING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE CEE COUNTRIES, 2004. See also, Leo Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and Carole 
Jurkiewicz, ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS FRONTIERS, 2008. Figure 10 
provides the Romanian ethics legal framework.   
68 Code of Conduct Law, art. 4b.  
69 Whistleblowers Law, article 4b 
parliament is unwilling or unable to explain when these various provisions come into force, 
interpretation must be done at the regulatory level.    
An Implementing Regulation for Romania’s Code of Conduct Law  
 
The adoption of an implementing regulation would add clarity and predictability to the 
present legal framework governing public officials’ ethics.70 An implementing regulation 
would help clarify ambiguous substantive rights and obligations. As previously shown in the 
examples of the conflicting articles 4b between the Code of Conduct Law and the 
Whistleblowers Law, an implementing regulation would define the methods by which civil 
servants could establish legal doctrines in order to resolve substantive ambiguities. An 
implementing regulation would also define clearly defined procedural rights which 
Romanian civil servants can rely upon in cases of administrative disputes or litigation. As 
previously discussed, Romanian civil servants already define ad hoc ethical doctrines (albeit 
without the explicit sanction or guidance from parliament). Implicitly, however, Romanian 
civil servants have – at least in theory -- implied powers to engage in such rulemaking 
(emanating from the Code of Conduct Law). A clear procedure would help ensure these 
decisions are recorded and consulted in the future. 
 
Given the present evolution of Romanian jurisprudence in this area, ethics counsellors – 
rather than working level civil servants -- form the subjects of such regulation. Ethics 
counsellors, not civil servants, received delegated competencies from their director and from 
the NACS. Ethics counsellors, and not working level civil servants, become specialists in 
the Romanian ethics-related legal framework. Ethics counsellors, not working level civil 
servants, face greater legal obligations from the present legal framework – and greater 
liability in case these obligations are not fulfilled. Rights over regulating on ethics issues 
should be assigned to government officials who possess the greatest experience dealing with 
day-to-day ethical issues.71  Thus, ethics counsellors should be the main subjects regulated 
by second rulemaking which implements the Code of Conduct Law (and other legislative 
instruments related to Romania’s ethics-related legal framework).  
 
Provisions Enabling the Creation of Ethics-Related Administrative Doctrines 
 
A regulation should formalise the already existing right (and obligation) of agency-level 
ethics counsellors to provide ethics-related counselling to staff. Such counselling should also 
include the competence to serve as a mediator in cases where the solution to an ethical 
dilemma between work colleagues differs. Such counselling would be particularly important 
for cases involving whistleblowing (when one civil servant wants to denounce the seemingly 
unethical behaviour of another). However, in the course of such advice-giving, the ethics 
counsellor still runs into the real, ambiguous clash of values inherent in any ethical dilemma 
(which as Figure 8 showed, the Code of Conduct Law fails to resolve).  
 
A regulation which implements the Code of Conduct Law should define a series of doctrinal 
tests in order to guide the ethics counsellors’ advice. Figure 12 shows the types of doctrines 
(as derived from the authority granted in the Code of Conduct Law and other legislation 
                                                 
70 An ethics-related legal framework, as previously defined, comprises the soft law and hard law provisions, 
specifically defined under a government ethics programme or policy, and found in various legislative and 
regulatory acts which aim to regulate public official’s conduct. 
71 In the language of new institutional economics, property rights over regulatory decisions (with specific 
regard in this case to ethics regulations) should be assigned to civil servants to obtain the greatest residual 
benefits. As previously noted, ethics counsellors are most inconvenienced by the present legislative set-up. 
Thus, they should have the right to regulate in order to maximise the scheme’s overall social benefits. See 
Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 2005.  
cited in the figure) which Romanian civil servants could rely up – if such a regulatory 
instrument were adopted – while making difficult ethical decisions.  For example, the ethics 
counsellor – giving advice on a case of possible nepotism – could apply an efficiency test. 
Such a test basically weighs whether the better use of resources justifies the social harms 
inherent helping a relative or close friend (who would be a better “fit” for the assignment 
even though he is unlikely to be selected by a committee) gain employment in a government 
agency. Such questions can not be answered a priori – as the length of time employed, the 
nature of possible competition and other factors all determine the relative costs and benefits 
of allowing such “discriminatory” practices to succeed. In ethical dilemmas such as these, 
the public official’s discretion – guided by the ethics-related doctrines advocated and 
adopted by their agency’s ethics counsellors – serves an important purpose.72   
 
Figure 12: Doctrinal Tests for Establishing Compliance with Code of Conduct Law 
 
Test Description 
Efficiency Test  
(allowed under art. 
4(e) of the 
Whistleblower’s Law) 
Establish a three-part disjunctive test for determining which of several possible 
courses of action result in the same outcome with fewer resources (staff time, budget, 
etc.), or cost more in the short-term in activities which result in long-term saving of 
resources (such as staff time, government funds, etc.), or result in a higher risk-
adjusted return – namely result in the same outcome with a lower risk, even if more 
resources must be used in order to guarantee these reduced risks. 
Effectiveness Test 
(allowed under art. 
4(e) of the 
Whistleblower’s Law 
and art. 5 of the Code 
of Conduct Law) 
Establish a three-part disjunctive test for determining which of several possible 
courses of action result in the better outcome with the same or fewer resources (staff 
time, budget, etc.), or prefer activities which cost more in the short-term in activities 
which result in long-term benefits to the public (such as staff time, government 
funds, etc.), or suppress any activity which does not directly serve the public interest 
(following rules only for the sake of following rules). 
Golden Mean Test  
(Code of Conduct 
Law, arts 3e and 3f) 
In cases where the public interest comes into conflict with the rule of law, the ethics 
counsellor shall work with the advisee to find a solution which both upholds the 
public interest without violating legal procedures. In cases where the Ethics 
Counsellor and Advisee can not find such a solution, the ethics counsellor should 
seek competent legal advice. 
Proportionality Test  
(article 4(d) of the 
Whistleblower’s Law) 
In cases where a whistleblower or public official wants to “take justice into his own 
hands” (but attempting to thwart the action of another), the ethics Counsellor 
provides an advisee advice on possible second-best measures (as stopping the person 
probably represents the best option). Ethics counsellor advice ensure these second 
best measures: a) do not cost more (or inflict more harm) then the harm the public 
official is trying to prevent, b) that the action corresponds with actions taken by other 
public officials in similar circumstances and c) would not be poorly seen if leaked to 
the press.  
                                                 
72 Many commentators would argue against giving Romanian ethics counsellors (and the public officials they 
advise) discretion in areas such as the case of potential nepotism we provide. They argue for extremely clear 
and strict “bright lines” and prohibitions – particularly given the risk of corruption inherent in the use of such 
discretion. Simple restrictions however can suppress the ethical dilemma – making the final decisions taken by 
these public officials less just. Prohibitions on public officials’ use of discretion to make ethics-related 
judgments may be compared to prohibitions on owning knives because owners may use these knives to kill 
someone. Clearly, the legal response to such a risk is to regulate the purchase, use and disposal of knives and 
not to establish an out-right prohibition (otherwise, society forgoes a large number of cooked meals). For a 
useful, though dated paper, covering these issues, see Robert Seidman, Drafting for the Rule of Law: 
Maintaining Legality in Developing Countries, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 1987.   
Figure 12 continued: Doctrinal Tests for Establishing Compliance with Code of 
Conduct Law 
 
Principle of 
Responsibility 
(clarifying art. 4(c) of 
the Whistleblower’s 
Law) 
Used in determining whether an ethics counsellors should accept denouncements or 
advice in cases in which a whistleblower or advisee does not possess evidence to 
support his or her allegation. Ethics counsellors can use a five-part list test such that 
the denouncement: a) can not be used as proof or testimony in disciplinary or other 
proceedings, b) helps establish the credibility of the concerned party (the accused), 
provides intelligence which may be useful in further investigation(s), the ethics  
counsellor assigns a credibility rating of the advisee (whistleblower) making the 
denouncement and/or e) the warning allows the ethics counsellor to draw conclusions 
about the Agency’s policy environment (or incentives provides to civil servants 
generally) – seeing the concerned party as only responding to general policy signals.   
Good Faith Test 
(clarifying art. 7.1(a) 
of the Whistleblower’s 
Law) 
The whistleblower is presumed to act on good faith “unless evidence to the 
contrary.” However, the law does not provide a definition for such good faith. A 
four-part disjunctive test could be applied establishing whether the whistleblower had 
evidence, whether the person made a reasonable attempt to confirm those facts, 
whether a common person would arrive at the same conclusion and whether the risk 
or potential damage significant enough to warrant action.  
Balancing Test for 
equality versus the 
public interest 
In cases or consultations where the advisee’s circumstances (membership in ethic 
group, geographical grouping, etc.) warrant special consideration, the ethics 
counsellor shall seek legal advice to ensure that such advice is non-discriminatory. 
Such an undaring doctrine ensures the most conservative application of the law.     
Source: authors.  
 
Such an ethics regulation would need to define mechanisms whereby ethics counsellors’ 
codify their decisions into ethics-related legal doctrines over time. As previously noted, only 
ethics counsellors should be allowed to create ethics related legal doctrine – as they have the 
experience and specialisation in this area. In a set of circulars (much like lawyers, 
accountants and auditors use), ethics counsellors can post recent interesting cases (leaving 
out people’s names). Other ethics counsellors can consult these decisions when taking their 
own decisions. The advice contained in these circulars does not comprise legal precedents – 
as the circulars have no legal authority. However, as ethics counsellors may use whatever 
reasoning the think will stand up (will be seen as just by the involved parties and succeed 
during any appeal to a superior official or administrative court). Ethics counsellors decisions 
comprise (a part of) Romanian administrative law by virtue of the authority granted to them 
by their minister/director and the Code of Conduct Law. Such a system of circulars has the 
added benefit that doctrines contained in them can be debated in the College of Ethics 
Counsellors (see below).  
 
While ethics counsellors should offer advice (comprising soft law), they should also have 
the recourse to hard law administrative remedies in order to give force to the ethics-related 
legal framework. Namely, in particular circumstances, ethics counsellors should be able to 
stop unethical behaviour for occurring (or mandate that public officials in their agency take 
decisions conforming to the agency’s ethical doctrines).73 Such administrative orders – 
coming on ethics counsellors on the authority of the agency’s minister or director – should 
safeguard the legal and financial interests of the agency. Orders requiring a public officials 
recusal (in a situation of a possible conflict of interest) or the return of a gift comprise 
obvious examples of the useful application of such administrative powers. Figure 13 
provides an overview of possible orders which ministers of agency directors should 
reasonably divest to their ethics counsellors.   
 
                                                 
73 Authority for such decisions clearly derives from the agency Director or Minister (being implicitly or 
explicitly delegated as a necessary function of the ethics counsellor in protecting the directors (or ministers) 
fiduciary interests.  
Figure 13: Administrative Orders from Ethics Counsellors 
 
Order  Rationale 
Order requiring the publication 
(or withholding) of information  
required by arts. 5.2, 7.2 and 8.1 
of the Code of Conduct Law 
The law requires Romanian government agencies to uphold the principle 
of transparency and openness. However, the law also requires statements 
not to harm the agency’s interest. Asking the agency director for 
permission for each relevant case results in bottlenecks (and civil servants 
giving up trying to share information with the public). Ethics counsellors 
should have the delegated authority to issue orders based on the 
minister’s or director’s policy preferences.    
Issue injunctions against 
particular types of workplace 
conduct (such as participating in 
political activities and so forth).  
required by art. 10 of the Code of 
Conduct Law 
 
The ethics counsellors should not act as a spy or hall monitor. However, 
if the ethics counsellors sees flagrant violations of the law, his or she 
should be able to order civil servants to stop such behaviour without 
going to the head of the agency. Such injunctions have the same legal 
force as direct decrees from the agency’s head (and expose the civil 
servant to the same disciplinary responsibility for non-compliance).  
Indemnify civil servants who 
take risks in fulfilment of the 
Code of Conduct Law’s 
principles 
art 5 of the Code of Conduct Law 
An request to a superiour official asking for permissions serves as an 
insurance policy...and indemnifies the civil servant in case the decisions 
results in any harm. Such extreme risk aversion results in the 
centralisation of administrative decision taking by the agency’s senior 
management. Ethics counsellors can provide support – in the form of 
written opinions – to civil servants wishing to “do the right thing” in a 
morass of bureaucratic encumbrances.  
Order Implementing NACS’s 
findings 
art. 22 of the Code of Conduct 
Law  
The Code of Conduct Law requires the NACS to communicate its 
recommended punishments (or resolutions to cases involving ethical 
dilemmas) to the agency involved. The ethics counsellor should receive 
these reports and implement them (on the authority of the head of the 
agency). The ethics counsellor should have the discretion to modify the 
judgment or defend the accused (if such a defence is warranted).  
Order to fill in conflict of 
interest declaration  
art. 9.1 of the National Integrity 
Agency Law 
The National Integrity Agency Law requires Romanian government 
agencies to appoint an official to ensure the collection of asset and 
conflict of interest statements. The ethics counsellor can advice on filling 
in these forms (what constitutes a conflict of interest under the law, how 
to value assets and so forth).  
Source: authors.  
 
While such competencies can be bestowed to ethics counsellors at the agency-level, 
Romanian administrative should develop a general system of ethics counsellor authority 
across the entire public sector. The NACS (according to the Code of Conduct Law) 
possesses the competence for regulating and supervising civil servant ethics – as well as co-
ordinating ethics-related policy across institutions.74 Yet, only ministers and agency 
directors can delegate the authority to implement ethics programmes in their own agencies. 
The NACS can not require for example that ethics counsellors in the Ministry of Finance 
conduct spot-checks to ensure that particular members of staff are not involved in a situation 
leading to a conflict of interest. Yet, different heads of agencies and ministers endow 
different competencies to their ethics counsellors. Some heads of agencies may take a more 
or less lenient approach toward the use of ethics counsellors’ powers (as previously 
discussed public officials in different agencies are likely to have different ethical values). 
Ethics counsellors themselves may have very different approaches to ethics-related doctrine. 
A system of administrative law must arise to cover the actions of these ethics counsellors. 
The current legislation does not establish a unified base upon which to endow ethics 
counsellors with administrative rights. However, such a system must be arrived at by 
                                                 
74 Article 20.1 of the Code of Conduct Law specifically notes that “the National Civil Servants’ Agency is the 
body in charge of coordinating and monitoring the application of the norms stipulated...[including] to monitor 
the application and observance of the norms stipulated in this Code of Conduct.”  
consensus. Such a consensus can only be reached by a co-ordinating mechanism – such as a 
college of ethics advisors. 
 
Dealing with Shared Competence for Ethics Regulation: the Need for a College of Ethics 
Counsellors 
 
Romanian administrative law requires the co-ordination of ethics counsellors’ competencies. 
Figure 11 has already shown the highly disarticulated nature of Romanian legislation 
governing ethics work – militating for a unified approach to ethics at the regulatory level. 
The NACS has the authority to make ethics policy, but not to enforce it. Each agency has 
the power to enforce ethics policy – but (to a large extent) does not have the competence to 
create such policy. As previously discussed, ethics regulation represents a shared 
competence between the NACS and the agencies which they regulate. A counsel comprising 
representatives of both authorities should determine ethics-related policy and procedures 
affecting the implementation of these policies. Such co-ordination would ensure that the 
development of different ethics doctrines and even procedures between agencies does not 
lead to a loss of predictability and consistency of the application of those rules.75 While a set 
of substantive rights and obligations governing ethics counsellors’ work may be too 
complex to standardise across agencies, the standardisation of a set of procedural rights (and 
obligations) can be enshrined in hard law.  
 
Romanian ethics regulators should adopt a consensual method of co-ordination instead of a 
more centralised method. Figure 14 shows the benefits and drawbacks to each possible 
method of co-ordinating regulatory provisions governing ethics counsellors’ work. The 
NACS does not have sufficient authority to grant specific powers to ethics counsellors – nor 
does the Agency have the specific day-to-day experience working with ethical issues 
involved in each agency’s work. One the one hand, a formal structure – such as the US 
Office of Government Ethics – would create an expensive structure which has not been 
shown to be effective.76 Ethics counsellors need to belong administratively to the agencies 
they advise in order to obtain competencies listed in Figure 13. On the other hand, an ad hoc 
ethics committee or assembly could not resolve the number co-ordination issues previously 
cited.77 An intermediary organisational form – such as a standing college – offers the best 
hope of resolving the co-ordination issues involved in setting up a working government 
ethics programme without creating an overly bureaucratic and inefficient structure.78  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 A consistent body of administrative law would not favour one service user (or public official) over another 
simply because of the organisational unit with which he or she interacts. Clearly, ethics related doctrine in the 
customs agency allowed ethics counsellors to provide extensive counselling services, whereas no such rights 
existed in local administrations, then customs staff receive an unfair amenity. Such an amenity may be justified 
by the nature of customs work (and thus no value judgment can be taken a priori). However, if all government 
agencies agree to such a situation, then such a situation could not be deemed unfair (at least in the eyes of the 
public administration).  
76 See MACKENZIE & HAFKEN, infra note 26.  
77 Only 30% of EU member states have such ethics commissions or committees. The general lack of 
effectiveness of ad hoc ethics commissions militates against having such structures, Demmke et al., supra note 
12 at 91.  
78 A detailed discussion of organisational theory (as it applies to the optimal structure of an government ethics 
institution) would take us outside the reasonable scope of this paper. For an extensive discussion of 
organisational design issues related to government ethics institutions, see George Frederickson and Richard 
Ghere, ETHICS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, 2005.   
Figure 14: Optimal Organisational Structure for Engaging the Ethics Regulating 
 
 Pros Cons Conclusion 
NACS takes lead Has strongest mandate in law and 
specialists in ethics issues. 
If the NACS takes the lead on 
ethics regulation, the agencies 
will ignore their mandates (as 
they currently do). 
Not recommended 
Agency takes lead The agency knows best the 
specific ethical dilemmas it faces 
(for example, customs ethics are 
different than the ethics of 
medical practitioners). 
If agencies take the lead, the 
NACS fails its legislative 
mandate to regulate ethics – 
leading to possible very different 
regulations across agencies. 
Not recommended 
Formal joint work 
structure 
Clarifies ambiguous distribution 
of competencies and signals 
importance of ethical issues in 
public administration.  
Creates another, expensive 
bureaucratic structure. Historical 
experience of ethics offices 
patchy.  
Not recommended 
Ad hoc ethics 
committees  
Assemble the most relevant 
people to take decisions on 
specific issues.  
Can not engage in follow-up nor 
promulgate administrative law.  
Not recommended 
Informal, 
permanent 
structure(“College 
Model”) 
Allows civil servants to create 
ethical regulations as required 
without excess formalism.  
Potential confusion and excess 
complexity if College becomes a 
political power within the 
administration.  
Recommended 
Source: authors. 
 
Such a consensual co-ordinating body – a College of Ethics Counsellors – would have 
several functions. Such a body would function as ethics counsellors’ professional body. As 
in many other countries (such as the US and France), such a professional body would 
guarantee ethics counsellors’ independence and ensure they have a body with which to share 
findings.79 The College of Ethics Counsellors would also help ensure that ethics counsellors 
issue incentive-compatible advisories and regulations. As previously noted, most ethics 
work comprises soft law – as judgment guides a counsellor’s advice more than well-defined 
rules. Ethics counsellors are likely to follow regulations more closely if they help to create 
them. Only by some form of consensus among ethics counsellors can they arrive at 
advisories which Romanian civil servants will widely adopt.80 The College can also act as a 
decision-making body for awards to members. Such awards would be given for advice 
leading to the major reduction of risk or safeguard of state resources.  
 
The creation of a College of Ethics Counsellors requires a power-sharing arrangement 
between the NACSs and line ministries which only a regulation (or set of regulations) can 
create. Figure 15 shows how such a College would work. Line ministries – including the 
NACS -- would agree to the ex officio secondment of ethics counsellors for membership in 
this professional membership organisation. Like internal auditors, these ethics counsellors 
have independence, objectivity and other attributes defined by executive regulation.  
 
                                                 
79 In many countries, the government employees’ labour unions have special associations or activities focused 
on public sector employee’s ethics. The US Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (COGEL) represents one 
prominent example.  
80 For a critique of the strongly neo-classical paradigm to public administrative ethics which we follow, see 
Ruth Grant, Ethics and Incentives: A Political Approach, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2006.  
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The Method of Adopting a Model Ethics Counsellors Regulation  
 
The effective implementation of Romania’s ethics legal framework requires that executive 
agencies pass a code of conduct regulation.81 Figure 16 depicts a model code of conduct 
regulation – which would be adopted by each Romanian agency. The first substantive 
section would deal with the selection and appointment of ethics counsellors. As a 
profession, ethics counsellors – like other professionals working in executive agencies like 
auditors or policy analysts – should have specialised training. Ethics counsellors should also 
receive high-powered incentives and other motivation of accepting the assignment of an 
ethics counsellor – an assignment which imposes additional obligations on their current 
job.82 The first section of the regulation would also provide incentives – as allowed by law – 
for encouraging ethics counsellors to assume the extra obligations imposed on them by law.  
 
The subsequent sections provide with the basis for the creation of legal doctrines we 
describe in this paper (based on the implied powers given to ethics counsellors by Romanian 
law). The regulation would establish the procedures by which ethics counsellors use the 
specific doctrinal tests (described in Figure 12). The regulation would also establish the 
procedures by which ethics counsellors can apply these doctrines in specific cases. The 
regulation would outline statutory rights and obligations related to providing ethics-related 
counselling services and establish procedures for complying with those statutory 
obligations. For example, this section would cover how records for whistleblowing should 
be kept, the types of situations in which the ethic counsellor must refer the case to the 
agency’s legal department and protections for the advisee’s confidentiality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 The definition of effective implementation of an ethics law bedevils lawmakers. Professors Mackenzie and 
Hafken provide a sweeping and comprehensive study of ethics regulations in the US, showing that they failed 
to improve ethics in the US civil service because of poorly defined objectives. See supra note 13.  
82 Ethics counsellors in all Romanian government agencies have been selected by their agencies to assume the 
additional responsibilities of their office. Most ethics counsellors work in the human resources departments of 
their respective agencies. The design of these incentives comprises an interesting paper in its own right. To 
keep this paper at a reasonable length, we focus on the more interesting issues related to the creation of 
administrative legal doctrines and avoid a discussion of self-enforcing, incentive compatible provisions 
regulating the work of ethics counsellors.  
 
Figure 16: Model Operational Instruction Related to the Romanian Government Ethics Officers 
 
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION ON ETHICS OFFICERS  
Overview and Background, Regulatory Impact and Risk assessment  
 
ANTECEDENTS  
Chapter 1: Antecedents  
 
APPOINTMENT AND CAREER ISSUES FOR ETHICS COUNSELLORS  
Chapter 2: Assignment and Qualifications of Ethics Counsellors  
Chapter 3: Incentive Structure for Ethics Counsellors  
Chapter 4: Publicity of Ethics Counsellors  
 
AGENCY-LEVEL TESTS FOR GENERAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND BROAD LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES 
Chapter 5: Interpreting Whistleblower Protection Principles  
Chapter 6: Interpreting Legal Principles  
 
POWERS OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY  
Chapter 7: Authority to Act as Mediator  
Chapter 8: Injunctions and Certiorari Relief (Suspension Orders and Orders Related to Witness Protection) 
Chapter 9: Internal Whistleblowers and Ombudsman’s Functions  
 
CASE MANAGEMENT  
Chapter 10: Introductory Procedure for Consultations  
Chapter 11: Procedure for Dealing with Unrecorded Consultations  
Chapter 12: Procedures in Recorded and Anonymous Consultations  
Chapter 13: Dealing with Ethics Counsellor Liability 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
Chapter 14: Relations Between Ethics Councillors And Disciplinary Committees  
Chapter 15: Relations Between Ethics Councillors and the NACS  
Chapter 16: Establishment of the College of Ethics Councillors  
Chapter 17: Disciplinary Sub-Committee of the College of Ethics Councillors  
Chapter 18: Ensuring Quality of Ethics Counsellor’s Reports  
 
FINAL DISPOSITIONS  
Chapter 19: Obligation to Consult on Present Instruction  
Chapter 20. Changes in the Legal Framework  
Chapter 21. Execution  
 
 
The regulation would also define the institutional structure and the method of implementing 
the regulation in the agency. As previously discussed, the agency must define clearly the 
competencies delegated to the ethics counsellor. The regulation can also define the way in 
which its ethics counsellors work within the College of Ethics Counsellors. During the 
adoption process, though, the NACS should take the lead in negotiating the implementation 
of the code of conduct regulation across public agencies. As shown in Figure 17, the NACS 
should negotiate with agency-level ethics counsellors about how a model regulation would 
be adopted within their agency (using the regulation shown in Figure 16 above as a guide). 
Once the NACS and the agencies’ ethics counsellors reach agreement on the wording of the 
final regulations, the heads of the various Romanian agencies must adopt the regulation. The 
head, along with his or her legal counsel, would revise the code of conduct regulation and 
eventually sign the regulation into his or her agency’s administrative law.  
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What happens if an agency passes a “bad” ethics regulation? For example, the head of the 
Ministry of Environment may adopt an ethics regulation which the NACS or the College of 
Ethics Counsellors disapproves of. In this case, the NACS has the legal right to require 
amendments – as granted by article 20 of the Code of Conduct Law.83 Once the College of 
Ethics Counsellors starts functioning, the College should engage in such enforcement – as it 
has representatives from the NACS as well as representatives from other government 
agencies who can apply peer pressure on the offending agency. Such an approach deals the 
distinctly political as well as bureaucratic nature of these codes of conduct.84  
 
Such a consensual approach to implementing an ethics regulation in Romania balances the 
widely advocated “participatory approaches” to code of conduct work with the need learn 
from previous conflicts. Figure 18 shows the way that many ethics laws – particularly in 
Central and Eastern Europe – have been adopted.85 The Romanian code of conduct work 
seems strongly influenced by the diffusionist approach to ethics work. The similarities in 
codes of conduct between countries in the region (as shown in Figures 3) suggests that the 
same international organisations provided consulting services to these countries.86 Civil 
servants in these Central and Eastern European countries widely discussed the codes of 
conducts and ethics models presented to them by international consultants before adoption – 
using the techniques popular in the participatory approach method. Unlike in many western 
European countries, however, these Central and Eastern European countries did not consult 
the case history of administrative disputes in order to help define the principles used for 
                                                 
83 As the Code of Conduct Law contains very few enforcement mechanisms, the Minister may be unlikely to 
revise the regulation. Enforcement clearly depends on the ability (and willingness) of the NACS to issue 
censures or even seek remedies at a higher administrative level, such as in the Cabinet of Ministers.  
84 Professor Dobel provides a powerful narrative showing how ethics codes in the US underwent extensive 
negotiating and bureaucratic politics. See Patrick Dobel, The realpolitik of ethics codes: An implementation 
approach to public ethics, In George Frederickson, ETHICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 1993.  
85 Saarniit provides an enlightening story of the adoption of an ethics framework in the case of Estonia, see 
Saarniit, supra note 6.  
86 The UNDP provides an overview of the types of assistance it and other organisations have been providing in 
the area of civil servant ethics. See UNDP, CASE EVIDENCE ON ETHICS AND VALUES IN CIVIL SERVICE 
REFORMS, available online.  
deciding ethics-related cases.87 Romania still has a long way to go in using such conflict 
resolution in its code of conduct work.88   
 
Figure 18: Three Methods of Lawmaking on Public Officials’ Codes of Conduct 
 
In general, three methods exist of adopting legislation on public officials’ codes of conduct: diffusionist, 
participatory, and conflict approaches.  
 
Diffusionist approach – takes code of conduct work from other countries, or international organisations like 
the Council of Europe or UNDP, and attempts to adopt as closely as possible. Most codes of conduct in Central 
Europe – including Romania’s law – stem from this approach. Most derive from already established codes 
existing – particularly in US and UK.  
 
Participatory approach – strongly advocated by American scholars and practitioners, this approach argues 
that codes of conduct must result from extensive consultation with government agency staff. A facilitator, 
often a very coercive one, collects statements about civil servants’ ethics and “distills” them into a code. 
Central European countries also like such a warm, fuzzy approach to civil servant ethics.  
 
Conflict resolution approach – codes of conduct should result from actual resolutions to previous ethical 
conflicts. These codes derive inspiration from administrative judgements and court decisions as the primary 
resource material for civil servant (and to a lesser extent public official) codes of conduct.  
 
In the public administration ethics literature, increasing attention is being focused on the conflict resolution 
approach for three reasons. First, previous court decisions and judgements already constitute law – thus not 
requiring code drafters to re-invent the wheel. Second, codes of conduct developed using participatory 
approaches often represent wishes instead of hard comprises. Participants developing these codes have few 
incentives to act according to them, except for voluntary compliance. Third, the diffusionist approach has 
encouraged predatory behaviour by consultants who come, develop a code of conduct – often copied from their 
own home country – and then they move on to the next assignment. Most Central European countries are now 
wary of experts peddling codes of conduct.   
 
Source: authors.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The effective implementation of government code of conduct work in Romania – and we 
describe the problems in defining efficacy – requires the multi-agency adoption of ethics 
regulations. Such regulations would clarify the substantive and procedural rights provided 
by legislative acts such as the Code of Conduct Law. In our paper, we discuss the ways in 
which regulatory drafters can adopt a doctrinal approach toward implementing government 
codes of conduct in a civil law system like Romania’s. We specifically enumerate the rights 
which ethics counsellors, who work in Romania’s various government agencies, have in 
supervising and enforcing ethics-related legislation. We argue that many of these rights (and 
obligations) derive from implied powers given by Romanian law. A key right constitutes the 
right to define ethics-related doctrines which can be administratively relied upon by ethics 
counsellors, their superiours and the civil servants they advise. By adopting the model 
regulation we provide in this paper, we think it will go a long way toward making allowing 
Romanian government agencies to comply with ethics-related legislation and make Romania 
a leader in the region in government ethics.  
                                                 
87 Researchers in New Institutional Economics have fruitfully showed how the resolutions to administrative 
disputes create Pareto efficient administrative legal institutions. For a background, see Jean-Michel Josselin 
and Alain Marciano, Administrative Law and Economics, in Jurgen Backhaus, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, 2005.  
88 College of Ethics Counsellors can help, as they can consider administrative disputes from various agencies 
to arrive at principles accepted by the wider public sector.  
